A b stract
Fntroduction
The Terminator (1984: dir. Jam es Cam eron) and Terminator II -Ju d g m en t Day (1991: dir. Jam es Cam eron), also referred to as Terminator I and Terminator II, are slick, state-of-the art science fiction films. A lthough they are p opular cinem atic art-works, they address serious issues concerning the relationship between the history and humanity of mankind and advanced, science-based technology.
In this article I shall attem pt to deal with these issues within the framework of H eidegger's m etatheory of modernity, which involves the crucial function of science, technology and art (including literature). I also hope to show that the paradoxical structure of time in the Terminator movies can be further elucidated in term s of the time-analysis in H eidegger's Being and Tim e, w here the em phasis on the prim acy o f th e fu tu re regarding hum an existence is particularly useful for the present interpretation. In addition to the application of these interpretive principles borrowed from Heidegger, an attem pt will also be made to in dicate th e relevance of H ab erm as's co n ten tio n th a t a rt has th e capacity to p u t an integrative and enlightening experience within reach of people (i.e. the public) in general.
W hat follows, then, is a response to the following question: Beyond their breathtaking special effects, what conception of humanity, its history and its technological creations do these two pop sci-fi movies articulate ?
Moreover, given the thoroughgoing scientific-technological fabric o f m odern (or, for that m atter, p ostm odern) society, should we not p erh ap s take note o f the serious and farreaching implications of this fictional projection of our possible future, even if, in the words of one of the films' characters, it is just "one possible future"? 2. Philosophy -mediating between knowledge, morality and aesthetic sensibility
The present essay is an interpretive philosophical, as opposed to semiotic, elaboration on these implications, and is predicated on the belief that these films cannot be written off as m ere entertainm ent. In the first place, like all genuine science fiction, they constitute a critique of technology.i Mary Shelley's Frankenstein (1818) and Ju les V ern e's Twenty Thousand Leagues under the Sea (1870) are paradigm atic early instances of this genre.^ Secondly, the 20th century has w itnessed a nu m b er of reaso n ed affirm atio n s of the ontological, epistemological and moral import of art, architecture and literature, in the face of the Enlightenm ent's relegation of art to the aesthetic sphere. These affirm ations include the work of Heidegger, A dorno, Marcuse, G adam er, H arries (cf. Olivier, 1987 ) and more recently that of H aberm as -unlikely as it may seem, considering that he has certainly not displayed a predilection for aesthetic issues. Nevertheless, David Ingram (1991) has shown that while H aberm as has acknow ledged (in accordance with [K antian] E n lightenm ent thinking) the legitimacy of a distinct aesthetic sphere, he has also argued that the latter should not be regarded as being exclusively accessible to trained experts. In H aberm as's view , th e g e n e ra l p u b lic sh o u ld sh a re in a e s th e tic ra tio n a lity "in th e fo rm o f allencom passing enlightenm ent" (Ingram , 1991:68) if not eso teric artistic and art-critical refinement. This means that according to Ingram 0991:68) a n should tra n sc en d th e realm o f subjective expression a n d illu m in ate life itself; ae sth etic ratio n ality s h o u ld a r t ic u l a te a n e x p e rie n c e o f t r u t h c a p a b le o f i n t e g r a t in g a n d tr a n s f o r m in g c o g n itiv e significations, no rm a tiv e expectations, and ae sth etic sensibilities.
W hat Ingram alludes to here is parallel to H aberm as 's contention (1988:312-313 ) that one o f the m ost im p o rtan t tasks facing philosophy today is to m ed iate betw een the th ree discursive fields of knowledge, morality and aesthetic sensibility. To put it differently, in m odern W estern culture three distinct spheres of rationality have developed alongside one another since the E nlightenm ent, namely a scientific-cognitive, a m oral-political and an aesthetic-expressive m ode of ratio n ality , respectively -each w ith its own distinctive discursive rules. In the course of increasing specialization, these discourses have grown further away from one another, with devastating consequences for the life-world o f human beings, w here they (i.e. th ese th re e d istin g u ish ab le m odes o f ra tio n a lity ) form one integrated whole. H aberm as therefore enlists philosophy as a reconstructive discipline to assist in the reintegration of the hum an life-world, which has been 'colonized', in his view, ' T h e d is tin g u is h in g tra it o f 'g e n u in e ' sc ie n c e fic tio n , n a m e ly , th a t it is in v a ria b ly a c ritiq u e o f technology, w as first p o in te d o u t to m e by Ja m e s Sey.
In V e r n e 's novel th e c ritiq u e o f tech n o lo g y is artic u la te d in te rm s o f th e am b iv alen ce o f N e m o 's s u b m a rin e , th e N autilus, w hich is at o n e an d th e sam e tim e a m a ch in e th a t p u ts m a n k in d w ithin re a c h o f as yet unim ag in ed w o nders, a n d also o n e w ith im m en se p o te n tia l fo r d estru c tio n .
by 'technical imperatives'. This is also what is implied by his insistence, that art (including literature and cinema) has the capacity to make an all-embracing enlightenm ent available to the public.
Ingram points out (1991:68) that H aberm as's thinking has to accom m odate two counter vailing tendencies -the reconciliatory utopianism of rom antic idealism as well as "the explosive n egativ ity of m o d ern realism ". T he fo rm e r type o f a e sth e tic p ro je c ts a redem ptive vision in which alienating societal contradictions have been overcome, while the latter disrupts or unmasks the apparent but false harm ony of contem porary secular society. While the Terminator films are not utopian imaginings of an ultimately reconciled society, and although the am ount of violence and destruction enacted in their narrative course may be seen as 'explosively realistic' (or even as a confirmation of the status quo in a violent social environm ent), these films contain elem ents o f both redemptive critique and of realism , as 1 hope to show. T he point I wish to m ake by way of this introductory excursion in term s of H aberm as's neo-enlightenm ent thought, is simply th at Terminator I and II afford us an enlightening experience. In other words, they enable an experience of the usually hidden truth about our technology-saturated world in a m anner that highlights the ambivalence of our situation.
Paradoxical time-relations in Terminator I and II
Sometimes paradox is essential to make a point, for example the Socratic docta ignorantia, that the only thing we can know with certainty is how ignorant we are -"I know that 1 don't know" -which D escartes used, ironically, to establish certainty. In so doing he provided the m odern version of the Platonic perversion of Socrates's paradigm atic philosophical insight, m aking the thinking subject the indispensable c en tre of the characteristically m odern quest for knowledge and control of nature. We shall return to the im portance of D escartes's epochal thinking at a later stage, but first we must look at the relevance of p a rad o x es of tim e in the T erm inator film s, rem e m b erin g th a t p ara d o x is a figure instan tiated in actions or statem ents th at seem absurd or self-contradictory, but which really embody truth of a certain kind. The Tenninator and Terminator II -Judgment Day depen d upon a paradox of tim e for th eir very narrativ e possibility. In both films, a term inator -that is, a sophisticated humanoid killing machine -is sent back through time to the 20th century by "the machines", controlled by the Skynet computer, to term inate or destroy a hum an being who stands in the way of th eir com plete trium ph in the face of rem aining human resistance to their rule. In The Tenninator the m achines' target is Sarah Connor (Linda Hamilton), mother-to-be of John Connor, leader of the human resistance in 2029 Los A ngeles. T h e ir aim : to d estro y h er b e fo re Jo h n is even conceived, thus precluding the possibility of his birth and of him becoming a major source of disruption to their bid for total dom ination in the 21st century. The humans, however, discovering the tim e-displacem ent unit, learn about the machines' plan and assign som eone to the task of protecting S arah from the term in ato r (A rnold Schw arzenegger). This m eans th at the hum an protector also has to traverse time, returning to 1984 from 2029. In the course of perform ing his duty the protector, Kyle Rees (M ichael Biehn), and Sarah C onnor become lovers, and it is from their union that John is eventually born.
3.1 The future depending on the past and vice versa W here is the tem poral paradox in the events I have just described, one may ask ? It consists in the fact th at, firstly, in Term inator I the te rm in a to r retu rn s from th e po st-n u clear holocaust future to a past prior to this fateful day. The latter results from the fact that p eople relinqu ish th e ir decision-m aking capability concerning n atio n al d efen ce to a com puterized system regarded as being infallible, but which does not fail to trigger the n u c le a r w ar in an a tte m p t to ach ie v e su p rem acy o v er hu m an s. T h e te r m in a to r's p ro g ram m ed objective is to p rev en t the b irth of th e p erson destined, from a future retrospective, to become a major antagonist and obstacle to technological rule. But, in the second place, the hum an protector, also ex-future, fathers the very boy whose birth the machines attem pt to obviate by intervening in the past. This hypothetical future, being the extension of a past in which the boy has in fa ct already been born, paradoxically becomes the condition of the possibility of the very past which, in turn, makes such a future possible -otherwise the human resistance against the machines in the 2029 conflict could not pose the threat which necessitates the term inator's mission in the first place. Why? Because the future leader of the resistance is fathered by a protector sent back through time by himself. This future time (2029) therefore depends upon the past of his (John C onnor's) being born, and this past (1984) depends, in turn, upon the future for his being conceived -a tem poral relationship of reciprocity or circularity that seems alien to our everyday experience of time as a linear continuum.
A past presupposed by a future
In Terminator I f -Judgment Day, the paradoxical tem poral configurations are even more complex. Again two em issaries are dispatched from th e fu tu re on a dual pre-em ptive mission. This time two term inators travel through tim e to the year 1995 from 2029. One (R o b ert P atrick) has th e objective to an n ih ilate Jo h n C onnor, who is by now a very independently-minded young boy of ten. The other term inator (Arnold Schwarzenegger), a cyborg (cybernetic organism ), is program m ed to p rev ent this from happening. (This protector-term inator has the odds against him, as the human protector in Terminator I did, too, because the killer machine he has to thwart is an advanced prototype model that can adopt the appearance of any hum an it has 'sam pled' by 'morphing'. Labelled a T-1000, it consists of mim etic alloy or 'liquid m etal', and shrugs off the most devastating effects of anything from pistol, machine gun or even shotgun fire. Only two things are lethal to the T-1000: extrem e, sustained heat and cold). Again the protector is given his a.ssignment by John Connor himself, reactivating the paradox of re.scueing a past that is presupposed by a future which, by securing that past, in turn becomes its necessary antecedent.
B ut this time around there is an o th er twist in the tale. Sarah C onnor is incarcerated in P escad ero S tate H o sp ital, a m axim um secu rity re te n tio n facility fo r th e crim inally d iso rd ered , for w hat th e psy ch iatric e sta b lish m e n t reg ard s as acu te schizo-affective paranoia relating to an 'imagined' threat concerning beings from the future. The disorder, so the chief criminal psychologist Dr. Silberman believes, is what prom pted her attem pt to sabotage a com puter factory, convinced as she was that these m anufacturing corporations were responsible for developing the technology that would finally precipitate the nuclear h o lo cau st. F ro m the p ro te c to r-te rm in a to r she le a rn s th a t th e m an m ost d irectly responsible for developing the m icro-processor eventually a p p ro p riate d for defence purposes by the military, one Miles Dyson, works for Cyberdyne Systems C orporation. After escaping from the carceral institution with the help of her son and his protector, she sets out to eliminate Dyson in a pre-emptive bid to avert the nuclear catastrophe of August 1997.
When finally faced with the task of killing the already wounded man in the presence of his wife and son, she is unable to pull the trigger, perhaps because of the boy's pathetic but moving attem pts to shield his father from her gun, or perhaps because of some conflict within herself. A fter all, can Dyson be held responsible (in the usual sense of the word) for som ething that has not happened yet -at least not from his tem poral point of view? As Sarah crouches over him, bitterly accusing him that it is ".... all your fault!" the frightened man looks up at her distorted face uncom prehendingly, stammering, "What?" And later, after John and the protector have arrived on the scene, and the protector-term inator has convinced Dyson that h e /it is really from a terrifying future m ade possible by -among o th er things -Dyson's research, the tem poral paradox strikes one anew; not only does D yson p re p a re th e way for th a t fu tu re , b u t th is fu tu re is itse lf im p lic a te d in th a t preparation. How is this possible?
A t the boy's (Jo h n 's) com m and, the term in ato r cuts through and rem oves the organic material (i.e. living tissue and blood) covering the inner metal frame of his arm and hand, revealing a structure identical to the one in the vault at Cyberdyne Systems Corporationsom ething Dyson has often looked at with awe. The m echanical arm kept in the vault together with a microchip (or C PU-unit) are the rem nants of the first term inator sent to destroy Sarah in 1984, but finally crushed by her in a mechanical press. Dyson is one of the few individuals at Cyberdyne who knows about and has access to it. W hen the protectorcyborg therefore 'bares it all' for Dyson, so to speak, the latter can be persuaded of the shape o f the future he is in the process of co-creating because he has seen some of its evidence before. H ere lies the hub of the paradox: Dyson is one of the factors in the seemingly inexorable march towards a ruthless future technocracy, but the products of that future (i.e. the rem ains of the first term inator) function as incentive for his research, thus assisting in giving b irth to the very fu tu re they re p re se n t. W hat N ietzsche said in aestheticist vein about the world being a work of art that giyes birth to itself, (Nietzsche, 1967; §796) is here the case with the future. It is operative in creating itself, despite the fact that it is supposedly the extension of a past w here humans voluntarily surrendered their volitional power to machines in the form of computers.
T he openness of the future and the open-endedness of the present
T h e in v o lv e m e n t o f fin ite h u m a n s, w ith all th e ir s h o rtc o m in g s, in th is w h o le past/presen t/future configuration is poignantly expressed by Dyson when he reproaches his indictors: "You are blaming me for things 1 haven't even done yet!" And, being human -i.e. lim ited in and by tim e and space -it w ould be im p o ssib le fo r him to fo resee the consequences of his work. T he relationship betw een John C onnor and his father (the protector in Tenninator I) is another case in point. In both films, the protectors are given their assignment by John C onnor in the year 2029. In the earlier film, this means that he chooses his own father, as it were, although it is tru e th at the la tte r tells Sarah th at he volunteered to cross time for her because he loved her from her photograph that John had given him. But, John C onnor having already been born in the past, which is therefore a given, m akes it inconceivable th at the future must be enlisted to gu aran tee his birth by providing a father, especially because, as Kyle R ees tells Sarah, it is just "one possible future", seen from h er p ersp ectiv e. If th a t w ere in d eed th e case, th e fact th a t they eventually succeed in destroying everything th a t was p rep arin g the way for the Skynet computer-takeover, in this way inaugurating a different future, would m ean, logically, that Kyle R ees's existence w ould have been an n ih ilated to g eth er with th a t future. A nd by cancelling out John's father (Rees), John's own existence would also be nullified.
Once again, human contingency is highlighted here: finite creatures that we are, our being born is no a priori necessity, only a contingent possibility; but this is no reason for despair. On the contrary, it is a rem inder that the future is in our hands and that we are not subject to an im personal and intractable fate. John C onnor's father-to-be conveys a message to Sarah from her as yet unborn son, the future resistance leader. "Thank you Sarah for your courage through the dark years", John tells Rees to tell her; "I can't help you with what you m ust soon face, except to say th at the future is not set. You must be stronger than you im agine you can be. You must survive, o r I will never exist." In Terminator I I Sarah is haunted by an image of the devastation caused by an exploding nuclear bomb -a powerful, horrific image of collapsing buildings, flesh being bu rn t and torn off people until only skeletons remain and flames that look as if they may leap out of the screen at any moment towards the audience, who is equally moved and appalled by the spectacle that horrifies Sarah. Having just come out of a kind of trance in which this catastrophic image held her in thrall, Sarah 'w rites' (cuts) the words No fate with a knife on a table top just before she sets out to find Dyson. Defying the technocratic future th at loom s before her, she thus confirms the openness of the future and the open-endedness o f the present. W hat is the significance of this 'openness' of the future and the 'openendedness' of the present? Just like a p ostm odern novel, which re-enacts the tim e-h o n o ured science-fiction them e of alternative futures, the present has no definitive conclusion in the form of an inescapable future. The 'now' which, as Augustine noted, is no longer the m om ent it is spoken, is the seed of the future, but the plant th at is always already being germ inated in the ongoing present acquires its appearance in large m easure from the specific character of the future envisaged by us. If th a t future had a definitive, p re-d eterm in ed shape sim ilar to the ostensibly ineluctable m achine-dom inated future hypothesised in Terminator I and II, we would live, like the blind prophet Tiresias, without hope.^ H ope survives or is revived only if the future is still u nd eterm in ed , to som e extent dependent upon the present th at we inhabit. This p resen t, in turn, is -as the tem p o ral p aradoxes of Terminator I and / / dem onstrate -d ep en d en t to som e degree on the specific way th a t the future manifests itself to us in our present.
We are future-directed beings
In this sense, then, we are prim arily fu tu re-d irected beings, as H eid eg g er's analysis of hum an tem porality in Being and Time indicates. The future, as o u r pro-ject, shapes our present even as our presen t shapes the future in a reciprocal relationship. "Projecting discloses possibilities says H eidegger (1978:371) , "that is to say, it discloses the sort of thing that makes possible". In other words, in the context of the historical situation of being human, the kind of future we are able to anticipate -given present actualization of past projects -functions as a directional incentive in the present. As long as that future seems fixed, present actions must be predicated on a belief which denies the 'authentic' structure of our own temporality, and which simultaneously leaves no room for any hope. Heidegger a rtic u la te s th e v ario u s asp ects o f hum an te m p o ra lity w ithin the fram ew ork of the 'primordial' structural dominant of the human condition which he term s 'care'. This simply means that everything humans do, whether it is theoretical or practical, presupposes 'care' -i.e. th at we are beings whose Being is unavoidably an issue for them selves. To live 'authentically' in the midst of all the inauthenticity of being among other people and doing as 'they' expect us to do, entails for H eidegger the acceptance of o ur m ortality. This acceptance, described as anticipatory resoluteness is said to free us, not only to and for our own Being, but also for that of others and of nature. The tem poral structure that belongs to such a 'freed' existence is described by Heidegger (1978:372-373 ) as a "coming towards" oneself that entails the following:
T h is le U in g -it.sclf-c o m c-/o iv ari/i-itsclf in lh a l d is tin c tiv e p o ssib ility w hich il p u ls u p w ith , is th e p rim o rd ia l p h e n o m e n o n o f th e fiilu rc as c o m in g tow ards. If e ith e r a u th e n tic o r in a u th e n tic Beingtow ards-death b elo n g s to D a s e in 's B eing [a re fe re n c e to h u m a n s' cap acity to accep t th e ir m ortality; B .O .J, th e n such B ein g -to w ard s-d e ath is possible only as s o m e t h in g^( u r a /... By th e te rm 'fu tu ra l', w c d o n ot h e re have in view a 'now ' w hich has n o t yet b eco m e 'actu al' an d w hich so m etim e witt be for th e first lim e. W e have in view th e co m in g ... in w hich D a se in [H e id e g g e r's d istin ctiv e te rm fo r h u m a n beings; B .O .], in its ow nm ost potentiality-for-B eing, com es to w ard s itself. A n tic ip atio n m akes D asein authentically futural, an d in such a way lh a t th e an ticip atio n itself is po ssib le only in so far as D asein , as being, is always com ing tow ards itself -th a t is to say, in so far as it is fu tu ral in its B eing in gen eral.
S The future; a matrix for historically meaningful actions in the present
The previous passage is im portant for understanding the paradox of tim e in Terminator I and II. What Heidegger says here will no doubt .strike readers as paradoxical as well. How does one com e "towards" oneself? A nd in w hat way is that equivalent to the "future as coming towards" or simply to humans being futural, if that does not m ean (as Heidegger explicitly points out) that it is a movement towards a predeterm ined future time which still has to be re a liz e d ? F irstly , we a re fu tu ra l beings in so fa r as o u r activ itie s are com prehensible in term s of their anticipatory-projective status, even if they are rooted in the past (or what Heidegger terms the having-been). O ur actions -for example hanging a picture, baking a cake, rowing a boat -are always the actualizations of previous pro-jects, as well as anticipations of, or preparations for som ething yet to come. Moreover, all of these actions point to the ubiquitous, tacitly underlying motif, namely that in some way or another, they aim at or embody an approximation of every individual's 'true' being. This is clearly reflected in the m anner that we customarily explain o r justify our own actions and decisions. We 'com e tow ards o u rselv es' in everything we do, w h e th e r th a t 's e l f is 'authentic' in H eidegger's terms (i.e. motivated by a resolute acceptance of individualising d e a th as in escap ab le) or 'in a u th e n tic ' (i.e. m o tiv ated by 'th e th ey ' or con v en tio n al expectations that 'cover up' our m ortality). In cases where our actions are fatalistically construed as predeterm ined anyway, with little or no choice left to us in the process of the present actualization of future possibilities rooted in past achievem ents or failures, these actions can only be 'inauthentic' in H eideggerian terms. In Terminator I and I I S arah's actions are therefore freed from the inauthenticity imposed on them by the fatalism and hopelessness of 'knowing' the future -that on 29 August 1997 Armageddon will occur -by the "future coming tow ards her" in the form o f a p ro te c to r-te rm in a to r th a t offers an alternative. The protector holds out the possibility of averting that seemingly inescapable future by identifying Miles Dyson as a key figure in its unfolding, which explains the words N o fate that Sarah carves on the table. The newly open or liberated future is poignantly captured in S arah's n arration accom panying th eir trip to Cyberdyne Systems under the guidance of Miles Dyson to destroy the fateful microchip and mechanical arm from the first term inator. H er words signify the transition from a paralysing, hopeless fatalism to the kind of (historical) tem porality appropriate to being human:
T h e f u tu re , alw ays so c le a r to m e , h a d b e c o m e lik e a b la ck h ig h w ay a t n ig h t. ... W e w e re in u n ch a rted te rrito ry , m aking up history as w e w ent along. This is precisely the point of the paradox of tem poral reciprocity in the Terminator films: the primacy of the future as a matrix for all historically meaningful actions in the present is such that, without it, one could not even say 'I', nor could one choose or decide anything. If everything were predeterm ined, we would lose our freedom o f choice and hence our hope for a b e tte r futu re. Term inator' s lib eratin g tem p o ral p aradox is an en actm en t of the reciprocity of past, present and future that Heidegger explores in Being and Time. It shows, in the words of Kyle R ees (in Terminator I), that a future w here technology has become totally hegemonic, is just 'one possible future' among other possibilities.
Technology's tem ptation: the danger and the saving power
If the rediscovery of the primacy of an open future in relation to the present frees Sarah and John from the stifling prospect of a technocratic future (in the most literal sense of a future ruled by machines), how do we deal with the obvious fact that a film with technology as a pervasive them e is itself a product of the most advanced film technology ? This draws o ne's attention to a parodic m om ent of the films: together they constitute a devastating critique of technology, but they have been m ade possible by the very technology against whose autonom ous functioning they w arn us. T o put it differently: the state-of-the-art special effects and illusions of the Terminator movies bear witness to the use or exploitation of the creative possibilities of a technology in o rd er to articulate a caveat regarding the inherent drive towards dom ination on the part of this technology. In parodic fashion, it presupposes and uses the very thing it criticizes. This tendency on its p art to becom e hegemonic features prom inently in H eidegger's critique of technology, articulated mainly in the essay, "The Q u e stio n C o n cern in g T echnology" (H eid e g g e r, 1977b). A b rie f reconstruction of this assessment of technology's place in the m odern world is necessary to understand the connection between the technology that m ade the Terminator films possible and the critical-reflective mom ent on which their narrative turns.
According to Heidegger, the most pervasively significant structuring force in the m odern w orld is technology. D espite its structural ubiquity, how ever, and partly because of its fam iliarity and its apparent innocuousness, it rem ains virtually anonymous. Furtherm ore, technology is indissolubly linked to m odern .science as its foundation which, in turn, has its metaphysical roots in the epoch-m aking thought of R ené D escartes in the 17th century. For H eidegger it was Descartes's metaphysics which transformed humankind into the only real subject -the ontological centre of all relations -in so doing breaking decisively with the lingering theocentric medieval thought-world (Heidegger, 1977a: 127-128) . Accordingly the world is sim ultaneously transform ed into a totality of calculable objects to which modern scientists apply their calculative procedures. In this way the ground is prepared for technology.
4.1 Technology as a distinctive mode to 'reveal' the world W hat is techn olo gy ? H eid eg g er b eliev es th a t it is a grave m istak e to u n d erstan d technology in a merely instrum ental sense, as a 'n eutral' m eans to different ends. This would imply th at technology is som ething that we can 'm aster', too, even as we exercise mastery over the world (natural and social) through technology. Instead he argues that the essence of technology consists in being a distinctive mode of revealing the world, a specific way in which 'truth happens', in contrast to the oth er ways in which it has happened in earlier epochs, or still happens in other 'places' where truth occurs, like art. In the case of the Greeks, for example, reality was experienced as pliysis, or as a dynamic actualization of potentialities. M odern technology, on the other hand, reveals the world, in H eidegger's terms (1977b:17) as a "standing-reserve". H e recognizes it as a kind of "unconcealedness" -his term for truth; from the G reek aletheia -characterized by the fact that technology as standing-reserve presents everything as 'ordered', 'stored' or 'set upon' for use, for instance the c u rre n t of a riv er w hich is 'c o m m an d ed ' into supplying hydraulic p ressu re for conversion into electricity.
H eidegger calls this process of storing up natural forces for use monstrous, because it reduces nature and even people into 'resources' for use, concom itantly obliterating their Being along the way. In other words, in this technological-scientific era we experience things as som ething to be mastered, ordered and 'developed' to an optimal degree. This way of experiencing the world is made possible by the essence of technology, term ed enframing by H eidegger. As W illiam Lovitt rem inds us in a note to his tran slatio n of H eid eg g er's text (19 77 b:1 9 ,n .l7 ), it w ould be a m istake to think of this simply as a 'framework', in the sense of the context within which we unavoidably experience the world in the present era. To be sure, it is that, too. But above all it is a process, hence the en-of enframing. T his process is so encom passing th a t it has becom e the condition for the po ssibility of ex p erien cin g anything today, so m uch so th a t noth in g can escape its pervasiveness. "... perhaps even G od is thought of as 'standing-reserve'" remarks Norman M elchert (1991:576), "a kind of public utility that can be used to gain the satisfaction of o n e 's desires; one often gets this im pression from the television evangelists ...." And indeed, technology is every bit as ubiquitous as H eidegger claims. Not only do we find a 'technology of religion', so to speak, but a technology of sport, of psychological health, of sexuality, of learning, of teaching, and so on.
The fact that technology and its inseparable companion, science, are so omnipresent, easily leads to the belief that there are no other legitimate ways to approach reality. According to Heidegger (1977b:28) , this impression constitutes the 'extreme danger', because it obscures our being by covering up the fact th at other, equally valid ways of revealing reality are possible. Two such alternative modes of unconcealment are thinking and art (or poetry). W hile enframing is the 'danger', thinking and art are linked to the 'saving pow er' which grows, ironically, in the enfram ing itself, to th e deg ree th a t hum ans pay heed to the revealing power of technology's essence (Heidegger, 1977b:28-33) . This is the case because as alternative modes of unconcealm ent, art and thinking recall the Being of things out of oblivion, supplementing the limited and limiting understanding of things that science and technology provide. W hereas they (science and technology) m aintain them selves in a calculating and mastering of things, thinking, art and literature, by letting things appear as they are, free them from the im perialism of enfram ing. Thinking, a rt and literatu re let things (nature, hum an beings) be. As such, they are concerned with tru th (H eidegger, 1977b:34-35; 1977c:49) . H abermas, it will be rem em bered, is in agreem ent with Heidegger on this insight into the integrative truth-function of art and literature.
4J2 Heidegger's critique of technology applied to Terminator I and II
It should not be difficult to assess the relevance of H eidegger's critique of technology for Terminator I and II. In Terminator I Kyle Rees sketches in broad outline the scenario of events that culm inate in intern ecin e global nuclear conflict. H e tells S arah about the im pending nuclear war, and th at it "was" started by "the m achines ... defence netw ork computers ... new, powerful, hooked into everything ... trusted to run it a l l ... They say it got s m a rt... a new order of intelligence. T hen it saw all people as a threat, not just the ones on the other side. It decided our fate in a microsecond ... extermination!" In Terminator II a desperate Sarah interrogates the protector-cyborg on the precise stages of the technological development that finally leads to global conflagration. As indicated earlier, he informs her that he has "detailed files" and that Miles Dyson is the man most directly responsible for constructing the com puter referred to as Skynet, because he develops a revolutionary new m icroprocessor (with the help of the C PU -unit from the first term in ato r in the vault at Cyberdyne Systems). But the most significant inform ation the cyborg gives her -in the context of H eidegger's assessm ent of the place of technology in the m odern w orldemerges from the conversation where he tells her that; "... C ybcrdyne will b e c o m c th e largesl su p p lie r o f m ilitary c o m p u te r system s. A ll s tea lth b o m b e rs a re up g rad ed w ith C yberdyne c o m p u ters, b ec o m in g fully u n m a n n ed . A fterw ard s, th e y fly w ith a p erfect o p e ra tio n a l reco rd . T h e Skynet funding bill is passed. T h e System g o es o n lin e o n A u g u st 4th, 1997. H u m a n decisions a re rem o v ed from strateg ic defence. Skynet b egin s to le a rn at a g eo m e tric ra le . It b ec o m es self-aw are at 2.14 a.m . E a s te rn tim e, A u g u st 29th. In th e p an ic th ey try to pull th e plug." "Skynet fights back", S arah in te rje c ts. "Yes", rep lies th e cyborg. "It lau n ch es its m issiles ag a in st th e ta rg e ts in R ussia .... b ec au se Skynet know s th a t th e R ussian c o u n te r-a tta c k will elim in ate its en em ies ov er here."
"Human decisions are removed"
The most im portant words in the previous paragraph are: "Human decisions are removed ..." In graphic fictional form, it m arks the symbolic surrender of hum ankind's humanity to the mastering capability of technology, its subjection to the standing-reserve of information systems which m anifests the m ode of ontic revealing th at is p ro p er to the enfram ing. C om pare this event in th e film n arrativ e to H eid eg g er's rem ark (1977b:32), th a t "... Enfram ing ... threatens to sweep man away into ordering as the supposed single way of revealing, and so thrusts man into the danger of the surrender of his free essence The tendency on the part o f people to valorize (especially com puter) technology to the point w here all shortcomings and mistakes are blamed on 'human erro r', is symptomatic of the w illingness, dram atically highlighted in the Term inator films, to relinquish humanly essential decision-m aking to what is widely regarded as the paradigm o f approaching reality, namely technology. As director James Cam eron's films suggest, such a surrender of our ability to choose would amount to a 'term ination' of our being. It will be rem em bered that the only hope, according to Heidegger (1977b:32) , consists in the possibility "... that we, for our part, begin to pay heed to the coming to presence of technology ... [which] ... harbors in itself w hat we least suspect, the possible arising of the saving power". This "saving power", it will also be recalled, amounts to the insight into the enframing or essence of technology as being but one mode of unconcealm ent of Being am ong others, notably thinking and art. Terminator I and / / are instances of film art th at reflect precisely this insight through their com bination of film technology and film art. Technology becomes self-reflective, as it were, in these films by placing itself in the service of truth, i.e. of the u n co n cealm en t of its essence -both via its (technology's) th em atizatio n in th e film narrative (W ittgenstein's saying) as well as by virtue of the dem onstration of its dazzling capacity to 'open up a w orld' (W ittg en stein 's showing). N or should this surprise us. H eidegger reminds us that the G reek word techné originally referred to art, and therefore belonged together with poiésis as the poetic m om ent shared by the fine arts and poetry (H eidegger, 1977b:34) . This initially close relationship betw een these root words should therefore serve as a constant rem inder of w hat technology and art have in comm on -a com m onality celebrated in Terminator I and II. They truly witness to the growth of the 'saving power' within the 'extreme danger'.
H ope for the retaining of the humanity of mankind
Perhaps the most exemplary aspect of Terminator II, as far as the convergence of art and technology is concerned, pertains to the fact that the protector-cyborg learns from John to respect human life, despite the fact that it goes against the grain of its own specific form of program m ed technological mastery, which consists in killing or term inating people. He tells John th at he has been designed to learn from people at a rate proportional to the am ount of contact he makes with them. And indeed -not only does he refrain from killing people from the tim e that John instructs him not to, but eventually sacrifices himself in a strikingly 'tragic', but more than that, humane, Christ-like gesture, literally (in terms of the narrative) so that John and Sarah may live. Symbolically, the protector-term inator's 'death' also im plies the survival of the whole o f m ankind, and m ore im portantly, new hope for retaining its humanity.
This sacrificial act on the part of the cyborg is a stroke of genius in the narrative. Basically it is a m ach ine, a lb eit an in tellig en t one. T h rough co n tac t with Jo h n and S arah it increasingly behaves in an anthropom orphic fashion, -to such a degree that ultim ately it shows itself capable o f an act most unlike the functioning of a machine; self-sacrifice for the sake of human survival. A rt and the essence of technology converge here, in the sense that what H eidegger perceives as the distinctive revealing power of both come together in the 'user-friendly' protector-cyborg. On the one hand it is a m achine, on the other, it disrupts our perception of itself as a machine by perform ing an act of self-sacrifice worthy of a human tragic hero, because it implicates a whole set of values concerning the essence and dignity of hum an life. A fter all, its own destruction does not only make the physical survival of humanity possible, but holds out the possibility that such physical survival will be meaningful, i.e. that m ankind's essential hum anity will not be perm anently obscured by technology. In short, the protector-cyborg reveals (to use H eideggerian terminology) the 'tr u th ' about techno log y 's essence as a n -o rd e rin g and m astery of reality , as well as representing the truth th at is characteristic of art, namely to open up a world for us by defam iliarising the fam iliar (in this case its own technological character). In this way, it epitomizes Heidegger's remark, that the saving power grows where the danger is.
S. In conclusion T he fact th at this essay adopts (as em phasized e arlie r) a philosophical ra th e r than a sem iotic approach to the Terminator films -in other words, that it focuses on ideas rather than im ages -should not be co n stru ed as d e tra c tin g from th e im p o rta n ce o f th e ir audiovi.sual sem iotic dimension. A fter all, they are cinem atic works th at function or are constituted primarily in terms of sight and sound. To analyze the structural-iconographic dynamics of signification in these films would entail a separate, albeit related study, hence a b rief reference to the im p o rtan t sem iological aspect of their status as spectacle must suffice. While it is certainly true, as Polan (1986) has dem onstrated, that spectacle plays a crucial role in cinem a generally, a strong case can be put forward th at it is particularly im portant in science-fiction cinema, where the them atics of an imaginative (and imagistic) extension of science and technology has to rely crucially on the im pact of images for the effect and credibility of its persuasive illusions. For example, the breathtaking sequences, in Terminator II, where the audience witnesses the T-1000 'morphing' or changing from one form into another, consist of a succession of images that merge into one another in such a way that their very sequentiality vividly dem onstrates the awesome, lethal capabilities of the machine -som etim es via the incongruity betw een the form it adopts (e.g. th a t of a woman) and the relentless, unswerving pursuit of its goal, viz. to destroy John Connor. In the scenes w here we see transitions from its policem an-(R o b ert Patrick-) mode to the shiny, 'liquid-m etal' figure-m ode, the spectacle is particularly pertinent to the them e of a dehumanizing technology. The scene-sequence where the T-1000 crashes through the glass panel on the motorcycle at the Cyberdyne Corporation building, becoming briefly airborne before attaching itself to the helicopter by means of arm s-becom e-hooks, and breaks the helicopter cockpit-shell before 'flowing' onto the seat next to the dum bstruck pilot, who promptly jumps out of the helicopter at the term inator's command, is a ca.se in point. H ere the visual images of intelligent humanoid machine (T-1000), riding machine (motorcycle), flying m achine (h e lic o p te r) and in telligent but v u ln erab le hum an being, com prise a spectacular spatio-temporal configuration constitutive of the (power-) relationships at stake in the film. The mixture of awe, horror and incom prehension on the pilot's face is matched by the viewer response to the startling cam era image of the killer android.'* ■' "In a sim ilar vein", an anonym ous, p crccp liv e co m m e n ta to r has rem a rk e d , "I, fo r exam p le, fo u n d a sc c n e (In T erm in a to r I I ) lo c a te d u n d e r a b ro k e n tru c k w hich th e T e r m in a to r tr ie s to r e p a ir, p a r tic u la r ly m o v in g a n d e x p lic it. ( H e r e J o h n C o n n o r e x p la in s th e c a u s e o f t e a r s to th e T e rm in a to r w ho, ig n o ran t o f h u m a n em o tio n s, is ab le only to re d u c e te a rs to b ein g resp o n ses to pain. P ain o f course, has d ifferent reso n an ce s, as th e verbal an d n o n -v erb al reac tio n s o f th e child ind icate). In a single fram e, th e c a m e ra c a p tu res feeling, thinking h u m a n b ein g (ch ild ), 'th in k in g ' m a c h in e (T e rm in a to r ) a n d u n th in k in g ' in a n im a te m a c h in e ( tr u c k ), in ju x ta p o s itio n . A ll a re pow erful re fe re n ts in th e visual articu latio n o f the th e m e o f th e film s an d th e arg u m en t co n tain ed
In this way, the Tenninator movies show that advanced film technology-5 may be harnessed by p o p u lar film art to open the eyes of those who are com m itted to the dream of a com puter technology-controlled world. They dem onstrate that we should not mistake a sim ulated reality -however 'perfect' the sim ulation -for hum an reality, even when we learn from it. The T-1000 term inator simulates everyone (and even .some things) that it has 'sam pled' so perfectly that it is impossible to tell the difference. In this way it epitomizes, in its turn, the seductiveness of sophisticated technology, as well as its 'danger': it simulates Sarah at one point in an attem pt to lure John closer for the kill. Usually (although not with Sarah) it term inates a hum an subject it has sam pled with the intention of sim ulating it. Baudrillard would point out that in a wider context, this is the case with the technologically sophisticated m edia today, too: they term inate hum an reality even as they sim ulate it (Baudrillard, 1983) . Despite Baudrillard's apparent pessimism Tenninator I and II give me hope, because, as film art com bined with film technology, they attest to th e integrative function that H aberm as attributes to art and literature, while simultaneously relativizing the totalizing claims of technology as enframing by providing a powerful rem inder that th ere a re o th e r possibilities o f Being. In short, as film art. Terminator I and II have affirmative qualities which contribute to the recuperation of the idea of being human in a w orld choking on technology. It is th e re fo re fitting to end this article with S arah 's concluding statem ent in Terminator II -Judgm ent Day:
T h e u nknow n fu iu rc rolls tow ard.s u.s. I facc il for th e first lim e w ith a sen se o f h o p e, b ec au se if a m aeiiine -a te rm in a to r -can learn th e value o f h um an life, m aybe w e can too.
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in th e paper." 1 found this com m ent very helpful.
F o r an in fo rm a tiv e re p o rt on th e specific ad v an ced film tech n o lo g y th a t w as in s tru m e n ta l w ith r e g a r d to th e s p e c ia l e ffe c ts th a t w on Indu.strial L ig h t an d M ag ic th e a c a d e m y aw a rd in th e ca tegory B est V isual E ffects for 1991 (fo r T em iinator I I -Judgm ent D ay), cf. C orliss, 1992.
